Multi-institutional application of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to CyberKnife Stereotactic Body Radiation Therapy (SBRT) by I. Veronese et al.
Veronese et al. Radiation Oncology  (2015) 10:132 
DOI 10.1186/s13014-015-0438-0RESEARCH Open AccessMulti-institutional application of Failure Mode
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to CyberKnife
Stereotactic Body Radiation Therapy (SBRT)
Ivan Veronese1*, Elena De Martin2, Anna Stefania Martinotti3, Maria Luisa Fumagalli2, Cristina Vite3,7, Irene Redaelli3,
Tiziana Malatesta4, Pietro Mancosu5, Giancarlo Beltramo3, Laura Fariselli6 and Marie Claire Cantone1Abstract
Background: A multidisciplinary and multi-institutional working group applied the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA) approach to assess the risks for patients undergoing Stereotactic Body Radiation Therapy (SBRT) treatments for
lesions located in spine and liver in two CyberKnife® Centres.
Methods: The various sub-processes characterizing the SBRT treatment were identified to generate the process trees of
both the treatment planning and delivery phases. This analysis drove to the identification and subsequent scoring of
the potential failure modes, together with their causes and effects, using the risk probability number (RPN) scoring
system. Novel solutions aimed to increase patient safety were accordingly considered.
Results: The process-tree characterising the SBRT treatment planning stage was composed with a total of 48
sub-processes. Similarly, 42 sub-processes were identified in the stage of delivery to liver tumours and 30 in the
stage of delivery to spine lesions. All the sub-processes were judged to be potentially prone to one or more failure
modes. Nineteen failures (i.e. 5 in treatment planning stage, 5 in the delivery to liver lesions and 9 in the delivery to
spine lesions) were considered of high concern in view of the high RPN and/or severity index value.
Conclusions: The analysis of the potential failures, their causes and effects allowed to improve the safety strategies
already adopted in the clinical practice with additional measures for optimizing quality management workflow and
increasing patient safety.
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Stereotactic body radiation therapy (SBRT) was intro-
duced several years ago but has become only recently a
recognized treatment option for many anatomical sites
[1–7]. SBRT delivers high radiation doses to small le-
sions with short fractionation schemes under the most
stringent conditions, allowing high dose conformity and
sparing of healthy tissue. This should help to overcome
the long-term toxicity concerns of conventional radi-
ation therapy (RT). To date, different techniques exist to
deliver SBRT, all sharing a number of common* Correspondence: ivan.veronese@unimi.it
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creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/properties: an ensemble of convergent beams or arcs is
used to target a circumscribed, well defined lesion [3].
A characteristic aspect is the high level of complexity
of all these methodologies, which places demands of in-
novative approaches to patient safety. Indeed, potential
SBRT-related errors could lead to severe injury to the
patients in view of the high radiation dose delivered per
single fraction. In this context, proactive methods of risk
analysis, aiming to anticipate the potential hazards that
may occur during the RT process, are particularly fit to
investigate the risks of this clinical practice. In this sce-
nario, the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA),
routinely employed in high-risk industry, is an emerging
and effective actor, recognised as a powerful and increas-
ingly popular tool for proactive risk analysis in modern
radiation oncology [8–21]. Furthermore, in order toarticle distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
ly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://
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ical exposure, proactive risk management approaches in
RT are recently required by the new European Union
Basic Safety Standards [22].
As far as the authors know, only few papers dealing
with the application of the FMEA approach in stereotac-
tic radiation therapy are currently available in the litera-
ture. Perks and colleagues [17] analysed the SBRT
process performed on patients with abdominal compres-
sion to limit diaphragm motion. Masini and colleagues
[14] performed risk analysis for intracranial stereotactic
radiation surgery practices. Similarly, Younge and col-
leagues tested the practical implementation of the FMEA
in the design of a quality assurance program for stereo-
tactic radiosurgery treatments [21]. In all these cases,
the RT processes involved the use of conventional linear
accelerators. When radiosurgery dedicated machines
equipped with an online tracking system both for static
and moving lesions are considered, as in this study, add-
itional specific safety measures have to be evaluated.
Such machine is CyberKnife® (Accuray Inc. Sunnyvale,
USA), a robotic image-guided frameless stereotactic sys-
tem used for irradiation of both cranial and extracranial
regions [23–31].
In this study the FMEA approach was applied to assess
the risks for patients undergoing SBRT treatments for
lesions located in spine and liver in two CyberKnife®
Centres with ten years of experience. The various sub-
processes characterizing the SBRT treatment were iden-
tified to generate the process trees of both the treatment
planning (taking into consideration the steps following
target and critical organs delineation) and delivery
phases (in particular including the tracking steps). This
accurate analysis of the RT process drove to the identifi-
cation and subsequent scoring of the potential failure
modes, and finally to the suggestion of novel solutions
aimed to increase patient safety.
Methods
SBRT with Cyberknife®
The specific SBRT processes implemented at the
CyberKnife® Centre, Centro Diagnostico Italiano (CDI),
Milan, and at Carlo Besta Neurological Institute Foun-
dation IRCCS (Besta), Milan, were considered for the
analysis. This study was focused on SBRT treatments of
liver (CDI) and spine lesions (Besta), using fiducial
markers coupled with Synchrony® Respiratory Tracking
System (SRTS) and Xsight® Spine Tracking System
(XSTS) for target localization, respectively. Common
feature of the SBRT protocol for both the Cyberknife®
Centres was the preliminary acquisition of computed
tomography (before and after contrast medium injec-
tion if required, slice thickness 1 mm, 15 cm extension
below and above lesion site) and magnetic resonanceimaging (before and after contrast medium injection if
required, slice thickness 1.5-2 mm). The CT for liver
treatment was acquired during a single breath-hold for
each of the three vascular phases.
The images acquired with different modalities were
then fused and used for accurate delineation of target
and organs at risk (OARs) contour. The radiation treat-
ment was then planned on the CT images without con-
trast medium with single or multiple fraction schedules
(usually 3, 15Gy/fraction for the liver case and usually 1
to 5 for the spine case, dose range 12-25Gy).
The CDI CyberKnife centre is equipped with two
Cyberknife® VSI™ 9.6 systems (6 MV X-ray beam, dose
rate 800MU/min and 1000MU/min, Multiplan® 4.6 treat-
ment planning system (TPS) and MD Suite administra-
tive application). The Cyberknife Unit staff includes 2
radiation oncologists, 4 radiation therapists, 3 medical
physicists and 2 office workers. The centre treats about
800 patients a year, equally distributed among cranial
and body lesions.
Liver lesions in particular are treated with the SRTS
system [32] intended to enable dynamic image-guided
stereotactic radiotherapy of targets moving under the in-
fluence of respiration. This system synchronizes beam
delivery with the target motion by building a model
(Synchrony model), constantly relating target position
and thorax respiratory motion of the patient. In particu-
lar, LED markers are positioned on the patient’s thorax
(specifically on a Synchrony vest worn by the patient).
LED motion is then detected by a camera array and used
to determine breathing waveform. Meanwhile, the target
position is assessed by the fiducial markers position on
the live X-ray images. Basing on the Synchrony model
built, the treatment manipulator adjusts and compen-
sates for the necessary movements to ensure an accurate
treatment.
The radiation equipment of the Besta radiotherapy de-
partment consists of two 6 MV X-ray beam treatment
machines: an Elekta Synergy® linear accelerator (dose
rate 300 MU/min, XiO Treatment Planning Systems,
Mosaiq Record & Verify) and a Cyberknife® system 9.6
(dose rate 1000 MU/min, Multiplan® 4.6 TPS, Multi-
plan MD Suite administrative application). The staff
collaborating with the radiotherapy department con-
sists of 4 radiation oncologists, 5 radiation therapists, 3
medical physicists (2 dedicated) and 2 office workers.
On the whole, patients treated with the two machines
amount to an average of 700 per year, mainly including
cranial and spine lesions, but only the Cyberknife® sys-
tem is used for SRT (380 patients per year).
For this system, treatment adaptation to target motion
for spine lesions is ensured by XSTS [32]. This non-
invasive system registers non-rigid and bony anatomy
landmarks to automatically locate and track tumours,
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cials. In particular, a region of interest (ROI) containing
an 81-node grid is defined when the treatment plan is
created. During treatment delivery the XSTS computes
target displacement by monitoring the displacement of
nodes of the ROI in the live X-ray images relative to the
nodes in the Digitally Reconstructed Radiograph (DRR)
images. XSTS is eligible for nearly 100 % of the spine
cases and, as in the case of SRTS, allows for the treat-
ment manipulator to adjust and compensate for target
movements.
Considering all the peculiarities and complexities of
the tracking systems described for target localization,
ample space is given to the related potential failure
modes analysis.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
The FMEA was carried out by a multidisciplinary and
multi-institutional team composed by specialists in the
SBRT process (medical physicists, radiation oncologists,
radiation therapists), under the supervision of experts in
risk analysis.
The first step of the FMEA consisted in the process
tree generation, through the identification of all the sub-
processes involved in the stages of interest:
a) treatment planning following target and OARs
delineation, common in most of the aspects at both
the Centres involved in the study [33];
b) treatment delivery to liver tumours by using fiducial
markers coupled with SRTS. This stage was
investigated on the basis of the workflow
implemented at CDI, by assuming as typical scenario
the presence of at least three fiducial markers,
correctly implanted in the lesion or in its close
proximity, in order to track rotations. The presence
of multiple lesions (≤3) to be treated with multiple
fractions and in distinct treatment plans (e.g.
metastatic patients) was also considered in the risk
analysis;
c) treatment delivery to spine lesions by using XSTS.
The analysis of this stage was carried out
considering the process implemented at the Carlo
Besta Neurological Institute Foundation IRCCS.
In the second step of the FMEA, the potential failure
modes, together with their causes and effects, were iden-
tified. Three indexes were then assigned to each failure
mode: the occurrence rating (O), the severity rating (S),
and the detectability rating (D). A ten-point scale was
used to score each category, ten being the number indicat-
ing the most severe, most frequent, and least detectable
failure mode respectively. The strategies and solutions cur-
rently applied at the two CyberKnife® Centres to mitigatethe risk in the routine clinical practice, as well as the qual-
ity assurance practices and protocols, were taken into ac-
count in the assessment of those indexes. The risk
probability number (RPN) was then calculated as the
product of the three scores: RPN=O× S ×D and subse-
quently used to rank the various failures in order of im-
portance. The ranking scales adopted by Perks and
colleagues [17] were used as guidelines. Finally, novel solu-
tions in addition to the safety measures and strategies
already adopted have been proposed to increase patient
safety. In particular, the failure modes with the highest
overall risk (RPN value ≥ 80), and the failures which could
lead to severe injuries to the patient (severity index S ≥ 9),
independently of the RPN value, were taken into account
for safety improvement. We would like to point out that,
because of the subjective nature of the analysis, the chosen
values should not be regarded as absolute and hard
thresholds, but as practical tools to identify the weakest
steps of the workflow that take priority over the others.
Results
The process-tree characterising the SBRT treatment
planning stage was composed with a total of 48 sub-
processes, as shown in Fig. 1. Similarly, 42 sub-processes
were identified in the stage of delivery to liver tumours
and 30 in the stage of delivery to spine lesions.
All the sub-processes were judged to be potentially
prone to one or more failure modes. The 5 most import-
ant failures occurring in the planning stage are summa-
rized in Table 1. Similarly, the main failure modes (in
terms of overall risk or severity of the potential effects),
identified in the stages of delivery to liver and spine le-
sions are shown in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively.
Discussion
Planning stage
The failures N. 1, 3 and 5 (Table 1) concern overdosage
and underdosage of target and OARs, and may therefore
potentially lead to severe patient injury or death. Their
overall risk can be considered moderate since the safety
measures already adopted are deemed to guarantee a
sufficient level of failure detection and/or a low fre-
quency of occurrence. An example is the presence of a
second independent global check of the approved treat-
ment plan by a medical physicist different from the plan-
ner (second physicist check). In addition, the practice of
including the number of fractions in the approved treat-
ment plan’s file name and in the patient’s clinical record
documentation (on the first page and in other dedicated
sections of the worklist) proved to be effective.
However, in consideration of the high severity rating
assigned, supplementary additional safety measures have
also been evaluated by the working group. As an ex-
ample, in order to reduce the risk of failure N.5 a clear
Fig. 1 Sub-processes of the treatment planning stage in the CyberKnife® SBRT
Veronese et al. Radiation Oncology  (2015) 10:132 Page 4 of 10management of multiple treatment plans for the same
patient was established by avoiding the presence, at the
same moment, of more than one deliverable plan. In this
way, only one plan will be visible to the radiation therap-
ist at the delivery station. Besides, the verification of the
presence of deliverable treatment plans different from
that approved by the physician, including even old treat-
ment plans not completed for any reason, was included
in the second independent check.In general, the improvement of patient safety may de-
rive from an enhancement in the communications
among the staff involved in the process, and from the
correct and clear traceability of the various actions.
Prompt communication becomes extremely important
when changes in some treatment parameters are intro-
duced during the RT workflow, in particular regarding
number of fractions and prescribed dose. Indeed, if these
modifications are not properly taken into account,
Table 1 FMEA of the treatment planning stage. Failures with RPN ≥ 80 or S ≥ 9 are listed
Sub-process N Potential failure mode Potential causes of failure Potential effects of failure S O D RPN
VI. Definition of the treatment
parameters: number of fractions
1 Typing of a wrong number
of fractions
Erroneous identification of
the fractions number on the
patient’s record, wrong
patient’s record (coincidence
of names), wrong typing
Wrong fraction dose
administration
10 2 3 60
XII. Identification of the align
centre and X sight-spine
ROI height (in the case of
spinal lesions)
2 Wrong positioning of the
align centre and ROI height
Inexperience, presence of
multiple lesions, damaged
vertebrae
Tracking non-representative
of the lesion’s movement
(underdosage of the PTV,
overdosage of the OAR)
7 2 7 98
XXXIII. Enlargement of the
calculation grid to all
the CT volume in the
three views
3 Missed enlargement of the
calculation grid to all the CT
volume
Inexperience, distraction,
haste, activity interruption
Missed visualization of the hot
spots in areas far from target
and OARs, partial evaluation of
the DVH
9 2 3 54
XXXVI. Physician’s approval of
the treatment plan, with
eventual re-prescription
of dose and number of
fractions
4 Missed or wrong re-prescription
of dose or number of fractions
Inexperience, distraction,
haste, activity interruption,
high workload, missed
communication between
physicist and physician
Erroneous dose delivery 10 2 4 80
XLII. Print of the report containing
plan data, of the dose
statistics table and of two
images representative of the
treatment plan (3D dose
distribution, beams entry,
DVH data and charts)
5 Missed or wrong printing of
the plan report, of the table
and images, printing of report,
table and images not
concerning the approved plan
Inexperience, distraction,
haste, activity interruption,
high workload, printing
performed not contextually
with the plan approval,
missed communication
among physicists
Missed check of the treatment
plan, delivery of a sub-optimal
plan or erroneous dose (in
case there are other deliverable
plans present)
10 1 4 40
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ure N.4, i.e. missed or wrong re-prescription of dose or
number of fractions, represents a clear example of this
event. In order to minimize the possibility of administering
a wrong dose to the patient, as mentioned in failure N.4,
several corrective actions have been introduced in the
workflow. As a general approach, the printing of the report
of the approved plan is physically attached to the patient
documentation, in order to facilitate the quick review of the
correctness of the data. As a corrective action, it has been
established that the physician confirms the dose prescrip-
tion (number of fractions and total dose) during the evalu-
ation of the treatment plan with the medical physicist and
consequently places his signature in a specific section of
the patient’s clinical record’s documentation.
The remaining relevant potential failure mode in the
planning stage, consisting in the wrong positioning of
the alignment centre (failure N. 2, RPN = 98), was char-
acterized by a low detection probability. On the basis of
this result, the double check of this parameter, initially
not contemplated in the already adopted safety mea-
sures, was accordingly implemented.
Delivery stage
A preliminary consideration, valid for the two Cyberknife®
Centres involved in the study, is that the potential effects
of FMEA on the patient’s safety do not cover only radi-
ation protection aspects. The execution of SBRT treat-
ments with Cyberknife® involves the movement of a heavy
robotic manipulator on a virtual sphere centred on thelesion, so the risk of mechanical collision and consequent
severe injury for the patient is not negligible. In the deliv-
ery stages listed by both Centres (Tables 2 entries N. 1, 2
and 4 and Table 3 entries N. 3 and 9), the importance of
patient instruction on how to call for help in case of need,
of the correct vision of the patient from the control room
with swiveling cameras and of the selection of the appro-
priate size (small, medium or large) for the patient’s safety
zone tool is therefore highlighted through a high severity
score (S = 9, 10).
The intrinsically high detectability of these specific
failures can be further improved by the supervision of a
senior operator at the beginning of each delivery session,
together with the issue of an operating procedure to
guide the therapist in the main steps of the treatment
setting. The periodic verification of the proper function-
ing of the devices monitoring patients welfare (intercom
and cameras) is also recommended.
As far as the CDI centre is concerned, the higher RPN
values in Table 2 are for failure mode N.3 (RPN = 160)
and N.5 (RPN = 80). The highest RPN value is related to
the missed check of patient and treatment plan data dur-
ing the loading of the treatment file. Even if the double
check operated by a medical physicist has greatly in-
creased the probability to detect wrong plan data in the
planning stage, the radiation therapist represents the
final check of the plan’s correctness. For this reason, it is
advisable to consider the independent double check of
the patient and treatment data by two operators also for
every first session as safety measure.
Table 2 FMEA of the stage of delivery to liver lesions. Failures with RPN ≥ 80 or S ≥ 9 are listed
Sub-process N Potential failure mode Potential causes of failure Potential effects of failure S O D RPN
IX. Patient’s instruction on how
to request the intervention
of the technician in case of
need (voice call via intercom
and/or lifting a hand)
1 Absent or insufficient
patient’s information on
the request for help in
case of need
Negligence, difficult
communication with the patient,
inattention, haste (intensive
scheduling)
Lack of assistance in case of
need, discomfort to the patient
10 1 3 30
XVI. Verifying the right vision
of the patient from the
control room with swiveling
cameras
2 Failure to verify the vision
of the patient from the
cameras, suboptimal
patient’s vision
Negligence, inattention, haste
(intensive scheduling),
superficiality, cameras not
working, presence of objects in
the treatment room that limit
the vision of the patient
Lack of monitoring (i) possible
collisions between the treatment
manipulator and the patient; (ii)
the patient’s welfare; (iii) possible
collisions between the treatment
manipulator and any object
present in the treatment room.
Lack of action in anomalous
situations; treatment not in
accordance with the planned
one; postponement of the
treatment session
10 1 3 30
XVIII. Checking the correctness
of patient and treatment
plan data, check that the
Synchrony field displays
“Yes”
3 Failure to verify the
patient and treatment
data correctness, failure to
verify that the Synchrony
field is active
Negligence, inattention, haste
(intensive scheduling),
interruption of the activity,
patient clinical record not
present at the time of treatment
Wrong dose delivery (in case of
wrong prescription of dose or
number of fractions in the
planning stage), elongation of the
work time, unnecessary live X-ray
images acquisition, postponement
of the treatment session
10 2 8 160
XXX. Selection of the
appropriate size of the
safety zone (small/
medium/large), based
on the patient’s size
4 Not appropriate selection
of the size of the safety
zone
Negligence, superficiality,
inattention, haste (intensive
scheduling), wrong estimate of
the actual size of the patient
Risk of collision between the
treatment manipulator and the
patient (if PDP alerts are ignored),
elongation of the treatment time
(for PDP alerts)
10 2 2 40
XXXVIII. At the end of each
session, compilation of
the specific section in
the worklist by the
technician who
delivered the treatment
5 Missed/wrong/partial/not
clear compilation of the
worklist at the end of
each session
Negligence, inexperience,
inattention, haste (intensive
scheduling), interruption of the
activity, patient clinical records
not present at the end of the
treatment, shift of technicians
during the treatment (high
workload)
Incorrect delivery of treatment
plans (wrong plan, wrong day,…)
if multiple lesions (plans) are
present, incomplete patient
clinical records, slowdown of the
workflow.
8 2 5 80
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cessity of clearly establishing the management of multiple
deliverable plans, as previously stressed in the planning
stage failure analysis. The presence of multiple plans at
the treatment console derives from the treatment of mul-
tiple lesions in the liver, all scheduled on a short period of
time. The simultaneous planning of multiple lesions is rec-
ommended to evaluate the cumulative dose received by
organs at risk. Each deliverable plan can be arbitrarily se-
lected by the operator for delivery and, if clear information
about treatment schedule is not provided, incorrect deliv-
ery of treatment plans (Table 2, N.5) might be performed
(e.g. not following the fractionation scheme).
The checking of the presence of one deliverable plan
at a time, performed by the physicist at the planning
stage, could be an appropriate measure to assure a low
occurrence of this potential effect. In addition, the rather
low detectability of this failure could be increased by en-
suring that the therapist always warns the physicist if
there is more than one deliverable plan per patient on
the treatment console.It can be noted that none of the main failures of
Table 2 is directly related to the tracking procedure in
spite of the fact that the Synchrony tracking system is
really complex and laborious, and influences the overall
quality of the treatment. In fact, the related most critical
sub-processes deal with: the proper detection of the
breathing waveform, the correct identification of the tar-
get (namely of the fiducials) on each live X-ray image
and the accuracy of the Synchrony correlation model
both in the set-up phase and throughout the treatment.
The severity and detectability of the potential failure
modes occurring during these sub-processes was evalu-
ated to be medium and high (S ≤ 8, D ≤ 4) respectively.
Indeed, it must be considered that the main parameters
of the SRTS (i.e. radial correlation error, rigid body error,
uncertainty value of the fiducials extraction algorithm)
are continuously available to the operator by means of
display graphs. Moreover, they are characterised by a
maximum pre-set threshold value that the therapist can-
not overcome. The threshold value is a software tool
helping to prevent errors, alternative to the double
Table 3 FMEA of the stage of delivery to spine lesions. Failures with RPN ≥ 80 or S ≥ 9 are listed
Sub-process N Potential failure mode Potential causes of failure Potential effects of failure S O D RPN
I. Call of the patient in the waiting
room
1 The patient is called
but a different one
answers/ The patient
is not called
Identification does not include
patient’s name, surname, date of
birth, photo-Patient was not
informed of modifications regarding
the time of the appointment, patient
is late
Delivery of the treatment
to the wrong patient -the
radiotherapy treatment is
not delivered or is
administered late
10 1 2 20
II. Verification of the patient’s
identity at the treatment’s room
entry by asking personal data
confirmation
2 Patient’s identity
verification by checking
all the personal data not
performed
Only patient’s surname check Possibility of mistaking
patients and therefore
treatments
10 2 3 60
X. Check of the correct view of the
patient from the treatment
workspace using adjustable video
cameras
3 Patient is not monitored
during treatment
Video cameras are not correctly
oriented or functioning
Cyberknife may hit the
patient without the
operator noticing it. Patient
may be in need and not
been seen
9 2 2 36
XII. Patient selection using personal
data (Name and surname)
4 Wrong patient’s name-
Personal data check is
not performed
Patient is called without checking
patients’ list-Lapse of memory
Delivery of the treatment
to the wrong patient-
possibility of mistaking
patients and therefore
treatments
10 2 5 100
XIII. Check of the correct treatment
plan and of the number of
fractions as described on the
report print
5 Delivery to the patient
of a wrong plan-plan
check not performed
Personal data and patient ID on the
printed plan not checked-lapse of
memory
Patient receives wrong
irradiation-possibility of
mistaking patients and
therefore treatments
10 2 3 60
XV. Check of patient’s name,
surname and medical ID by
flagging the appropriate box for
acceptance
6 Patient’s personal data
not checked
Automatic action- Lapse of memory Wrong patient or treatment-
possibility of mistaking
patients and therefore
treatments
10 2 7 140
XVI. Check of: plan name, tracking
method (XSight spine), path,
number of fraction, collimator
type and aperture-flag of the
appropriate box for acceptance
7 Data check is wrong or
not performed
High workload-lapse of memory Wrong patient or
treatment-possibility of
mistaking patients and
therefore treatments
10 2 7 140
XVII. Accurate alignment of the
patient by comparing DRR and
live images: adjustment of the
values and tolerance levels
defined in the image parameters
window-adjustment of the X
Sight Spine ROI dimensions
8 Wrong alignment-
Threshold levels of the
different parameters
not modified when
necessary
Difficulty to visually identify spine
tract in the live images-Lapse of
memory, insufficient experience of
the operator with the treatment
system
Treatment not properly
delivered-longer time to
start treatment
10 1 4 40
XIX. Setting of the most appropriate
patient size
9 Appropriate patient
size not set
Lapse of memory, insufficient
experience of the operator with the
delivery system
Possible collisions or errors
of the PDP system slowing
down treatment
9 2 5 90
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overall risk of the potential failures related to the Syn-
chrony tracking procedure can be assessed not signifi-
cant (RPN < 80), as long as the therapists have been
accurately trained in order to successfully deal with
these tools.
In treatment delivery to spine lesions the potential fail-
ure modes, causes and effects for Besta Institute are re-
ported in Table 3. The first two entries of the table
concern patient call and identification by the radiation
therapist. The potential detriment in these steps lies in
the fact that an erroneous identification would lead to
the delivery of a high dose treatment (according to the
fractionation scheme) to the wrong patient and possibly
to healthy tissue. A routine practice has therefore beenintroduced, according to which identity is being verified
by the radiation therapist by letting the patient itself
state personal information (such as birth date) immedi-
ately after entering the treatment area. This, together
with the availability of photos in the patient’s digital rec-
ord, decreases failure detectability score and consequently
reduces RPN.
Failure modes four to seven all deal with verification
of patient’s personal and treatment plan information
(such as patient’s name and surname, plan name, num-
ber of fractions, collimator type and size etc.). At this
stage, the Cyberknife® system provides the radiation
therapist with many checkpoints to be ticked off. The
highest RPN in Table 3 is associated with these steps of
the delivery process for spinal lesions, mainly because of
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diation protection effects (patient receives wrong irradi-
ation). Probability of detecting for these failures is also
deemed to be low. Potential causes of the failures have
been usually identified with the operator having a lapse
of memory or dealing automatically with the procedure.
For this reason, implemented corrective actions are
mainly addressed to the radiation therapist and consist
in: inhibition to start delivery if a printed copy of the
treatment plan is not available for double check, speak-
ing out loud treatment information while ticking them
off and attendance to periodic courses on the subject.
Entry N. 8 deals with accurate alignment of the patient
on the treatment couch by adjusting image parameters.
Severity score for this entry was rated 10 since a poor
choice of the imaging parameters might lead to the iden-
tification and treatment of an erroneous spine tract.
Also, possibility to deliver an approved plan to the
wrong patient cannot be excluded since, a priori, differ-
ent spine tracts could be matched within imaging par-
ameter threshold values. The most sensitive of these
parameters is the False Node Threshold. A node is iden-
tified as a false node if no correlation is found between
the Live X-ray and DRR images. A default threshold for
the allowable percentage of rejected node candidates in
the ROI is pre-set by the system at 50 %, but as a pre-
caution the radiation therapist tries to keep it around
15 % or less, an higher value being an alert for further
investigations. Further safety measures helping to keep a
good detectability are the presence of a more expert ra-
diation therapist taking part in the alignment procedure
as a support in case of unclear or damaged vertebral
anatomy or uncertain localization. Furthermore the cor-
rect matching of DRR and live images is validated by a
physician before starting each treatment fraction.
In the failures analysis relative to the delivery stage for
liver treatments the possibility to deliver an approved
plan to a wrong patient was intentionally excluded. The
tracking algorithm assesses the correspondence between
the marker’s position in the DRR and in the live images
with the Rigid Body Error parameter: a high value indi-
cates a different configuration of the fiducials in the live
images, probably due to a migration or to a wrong iden-
tification. The maximum value allowed for this param-
eter is 5 mm but the tracking reliability is judged as
acceptable up to 3 mm. Basing on the assumed scenario
of at least three fiducial markers implanted in lesion or
in its close proximity and on the adoption of a good
practice (Rigid Body Error < 3 mm) the authors are
deeply confident that a plan cannot be delivered to a
wrong patient, since three fiducials could not be im-
planted with the same rigid body configuration on differ-
ent patients. This conclusion is valid only for at least
three fiducial markers.In addition to the failure modes specifically identified
in the workflow of the two Cyberknife® Centres, a careful
consideration about the aspect of traceability in SBRT
treatments is required. As already mentioned in this
work, it is not uncommon for one patient to receive two
or more SBRT treatments over few months or years. In-
deed, many treatments are performed on multiple lesion
sites or on metastases that can recur either locally or in
other regions of the spine or liver. In such events, trace-
ability and record keeping are essential in order to guar-
antee patient safety in case a lesion is re-treated or
different sites are irradiated in subsequent steps. Each
Cyberknife® system is equipped with a Cyberknife® Data
Management System (CDMS), which provides the stor-
age of Cyberknife® System patient, user and system data,
as well as applications and interfaces to access, add,
modify, export, delete, generate reports and validate
data. The plan administration tasks for the data manage-
ment system contain tools enabling the user to perform
administration tasks on the displayed list of active pa-
tients with their associated treatment, Quality Assurance
and simulation plans. However, although patient records
are present, the CDMS cannot in general be considered
as a complete Record and Verify (R&V) system, due to
two main shortcomings. The first one is that it is not
provided with the possibility of inserting a treatment
strategy (e.g. dose per fraction, fraction schedule etc.), to
be compared to the one sent by the TPS for independent
verification and approval.
Second point is that the CDMS does not allow the
storage of a shared complete set of dosimetric informa-
tion if multiple treatments to the same patient have been
administered with different Linacs, even if they are all
Cyberknife systems. Availability of the complete medical
record in a dedicated computerized management system
would allow for proper evaluation of the dose already
delivered. This would provide the physician and medical
physicist with all the appropriate information for a new
dose prescription and dose-volume limits for the OARs,
thus consistently reducing the risk of undesired and po-
tentially dangerous overdose to healthy structures.
If a fully integrated R&V is not available all patient
medical records should be manually registered at least in
one computerized system or in paper format (including
the dosimetric data), in order to be always available at
least at the first clinical visit. Being critical and time con-
suming, this practice cannot prescind from an adequate
staff presence.
Conclusions
The multi-institutional application of FMEA to the plan-
ning and delivery stages in SBRT performed with Cyber-
Knife® led to the identification of the various potential
failure modes. Their analysis allowed to enhance the
Veronese et al. Radiation Oncology  (2015) 10:132 Page 9 of 10safety strategies already adopted in the clinical practice
with additional measures for optimizing quality manage-
ment workflow and increasing patient safety.
Some of the new solutions are specifically related to
the CyberKnife® treatments; others are common to pre-
vious FMEA analyses [10–13] and confirmed the sound-
ness of the general lessons and recommendations for
preventing accidental exposures in the modern radiation
therapy [9]. In particular, from this study came out that
the competence and skill of the staff dealing with the
workflow, together with a systematic double check of
the main critical parameters of the process, play a de-
cisive role for the patient safety and treatment quality.
Therefore, the establishment of dedicated training
schemes on the operations and limits of the tools and
software employed in the RT process, as well as on the
related procedures and protocols, may drastically con-
tribute to reduce the frequency of failures and, conse-
quently, the overall risk of accidents. Finally, excessive
workload and haste should be avoided, and the work en-
vironment should encourage working with awareness,
avoid distractions and facilitate concentration.
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